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ABSTRACT
ERGODICITY AND YOU: ADAPTIVE HEURISTICS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
Justin Zovas
Life requires making decisions under uncertainty. Facing complex, dynamic
environments, decision-making processes should focus on the consequences of
choices with time as a fundamental consideration. To that end, I recommend
honing adaptive heuristics through trial and error while maintaining a margin of
safety from ruin.
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Russian Roulette and You
Imagine a revolver pointed at your head – a bullet placed randomly in one of its six chambers.
The gun holder offers a proposition: if you let her pull the trigger and nothing comes out, you
win ten million dollars. Would you play?
Five out of six times you win big but the other outcome looms large. A profit-maximizing robot,
undeterred by ruin, accepts the offer; the expected value is massive! But for nearly all of us
humans the choice is a no-brainer. We are born, time passes, and then we die. Time is scarce and
irreversible – it’s all we have. Time is the currency of life.
Ergodicity and You
Consider another game where players wager money on a series of coin flips. A player chooses
how much money to risk, which represents his initial wealth, and then a coin is flipped in
succession. If the coin lands heads, wealth increases by 30%; if it lands tails, wealth decreases by
25%. Would you play?
I created a simulation of this game where 100 players, each starting with an initial wealth of
$100, flip a coin 100 times. Figure 1 shows each player’s wealth changes as well as the average
and median wealth after each flip. On average, a player’s wealth is expected to increase, but
notice how many players performed worse than the average path.

Figure 1: Coin flip game outcomes over 100 days (100 players each starting with $100)
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In this simulation, the average final wealth after 100 flips is $519, yet the median final wealth is
only $16. 87% of players performed worse than average and 68% of players lost money. How is
this possible? Because wealth changes in percentage terms, the sequence of coin flips matters:
flipping heads on the first flip and tails on the second flip is not the same as flipping tails then
heads. The game’s multiplicative nature creates a few players who accrue massive winnings that
dwarf the majority of other players’ earnings.
Russian roulette and this coin flip game are toy examples that highlight a concept called
ergodicity. Ergodic theory recognizes that expected value – the ensemble average of the
probability space – does not necessarily equal the average outcome over time1.
An indexed sequence of random variables called a stochastic process can help evaluate
ergodicity. These random processes model unique paths through time. A stochastic process is
(perfectly) ergodic if its expected value equals the average outcome as time approaches infinity1.
In a non-ergodic process like the two examples discussed, the time average differs from the
expected value.
The coin flip game has a positive expected value, computed as follows:
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ × [ 𝑃(ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠) × (1 + 0.3) + 𝑃(𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠) × (1 – 0.25) ]
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ × 1.025
But the game’s time average expectation is negative:
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ × √1.3 × .75
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ × 0.987
As time passes – with each additional coin flip or trigger pull – the probability of losing all that
was risked approaches one. Path dependence, where subsequent outcomes depend on prior
results, creates an inequality between the ensemble average and time average. Ergodic theory
emerged in the late 19th century in the field of statistical mechanics, particularly thermodynamics
and the study of gas molecules, and is relevant to any dynamical system1.
The critical flaw of expected value is its failure to account for a fundamental element of
existence: time. By weighting all possible outcomes by their probability of occurrence, expected
value views life as a collection of multiple simultaneous realities. In the real-world, the passage
of time ensures we each experience one unique path and cannot access the other parallel
universes that form expected value. Consequently, the weighted average of all possibilities may
not equal individuals’ average outcome over time. Time averages are relevant to individuals so
relying on expected value when making decisions can be misleading.
I suspect humans innately understood ergodicity before we had a word for it.
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The Environment and You
Evolution over millions of years has selected traits conducive to survival. Charles Darwin argued
the environment influences human behavior through natural selection. Environmental
characteristics made certain behaviors more favorable than others. Those better adapted to the
environment had more babies than those less adapted2. The logic follows that humans who
optimized time average performance were more likely to reproduce (while Russian roulette
enthusiasts tended to exit the gene pool). From a Darwinian view, our choice behavior under risk
reflects a disposition to prioritize time average outcomes over expected value.
Recent experimental evidence supports this claim. David Meder and his colleagues measured
subjects’ choice behavior by manipulating the ergodic properties of an experimental gambling
environment. The researchers found subjects systematically adjusted their risk preferences to
optimize time average performance3. These results support recent economic theory developed by
Ole Peters and Murray Gell-Mann that argues decision-making should be sensitive to the
particular risk dynamic1
The experiment compared decision-making under additive versus multiplicative gambling
dynamics. Additive changes like your bi-weekly paycheck are ergodic: maximizing the expected
value of additive wealth changes corresponds to maximizing time average growth. In contrast,
under multiplicative dynamics like reproduction or investing, outcomes are non-ergodic due to
path dependency*. Most of life’s risks are multiplicative, notably the self-producing nature of
evolution and capitalism.
Multiplicative environments require a logarithmic utility function to ensure ergodicity. In other
words, when facing multiplicative risk, one’s utility function should adjust so that it is more
sensitive to wealth changes. The crucial implication on behavior is increased risk aversion under
multiplicative dynamics (relative to additive dynamics)1.
The experimental subjects may not know those technical details, but their behavior reflects an
inherent understanding of ergodicity. The results suggested a time average optimization model
best explained subjects’ behavior3. Subjects adapted their utility functions to realize ergodicity:
their choices reflected linear utility functions for additive gambles and non-linear utility
functions for multiplicative gambles. In order to maximize time average wealth growth, subjects
exhibited increased risk aversion when facing multiplicative risk.
These findings contradict traditional utility theory models that suggest humans are indifferent to
the dynamics of the environment1. A behavioral model that assumes humans maximize expected
value without regard to ergodicity is inaccurate. When a risky dynamic is non-ergodic, it is
foolish to optimize for expected value.
*Multiplicative dynamics generate a non-stationary stochastic process. A random process is stationary if the
variables are invariant to shifts in the time index; for a non-stationary process, the distribution of outcomes at time n
may differ from the distribution at time n + 14.
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Predictions and You
We seek order amidst chaos and view the world deterministically5. Determinism suggests
outcomes can be linked to causes. In an effort to understand the past and predict the future, we
seek clean, causal explanations. We prefer things happen for intelligible reasons and tend to
minimize the role of chance5,6. To admit “I don’t know” makes you confront an uncomfortable
truth whereas legibility reduces anxiety.
The problem is, the coherence of our explanatory narratives is far more persuasive than the
quality of information supporting them6. Coherence requires logic and consistency, which
problematically is function of our preexisting beliefs and (severely limited) past experiences6.
These tendencies deceive us into thinking the world is more intelligible and predictable than it
truly is. Yet, we are wired to make predictions; we must get out of bed and make uncertain
choices daily. So what to do?
In domains with reliable mathematic relationships, deterministic models are helpful. But
wherever human behavior plays a role, things get messy. For example, here’s a subtle
distinction: scientists and engineers can develop sophisticated algorithms that excels at chess but
creating an artificial intelligence that dominates a poker tournament is more difficult. There is a
human element present in poker that makes it less tractable for a rules-based machine. As
Richard Feynman famously said, “Imagine how much harder physics would be if electrons had
feelings”.
An initial hurdle to making good decisions is embracing randomness and uncertainty. Thinking
probabilistically helps you make informed decisions. It forces you consider multiple possible
outcomes and assign likelihoods to them. You gain awareness for counterfactuals and recognize
far more can happen than did happen. Research from Philip Tetlock finds human forecasters can
benefit from the ability to distinguish up to twenty degrees of uncertainty, reflecting sensitivity
to a 5% difference in likelihood10. Three degrees of uncertainty, for example, could view a future
event as either likely, unlikely, or a 50/50 proposition. 20 degrees is impressive precision and
provides hope that human judgement – the result of millions of years of us making predictions,
genes entering and exiting the pool – can be effective in today’s environment.
How do you measure uncertainty? First, distinguish known unknowns from unknown unknowns.
Known unknowns represent inherent, irreducible variability. Coin flips and casino games are true
known unknowns. Epistemic uncertainty is uncertainty due to a lack of knowledge; it can be
reduced over time but never eliminated5.
We prefer known unknowns to unknown unknowns. Confidence in a variable’s probability
distribution helps us avoid admitting “I don’t know” and enables statistical inference: we can
measure variance, draw conclusions, and make predictions. When dealing with unknown
unknowns, however, statistical tools become less effective, useless, or even harmful. Bad
outcomes occur when you think you know something that you don’t – naïve beliefs.
6

The problem with unknown unknowns is two-fold: not only are they absent from (or not properly
reflected in) the probability distribution, but disregarding their (invisible) presence is perilous.
This is why we should be wary of relying too heavily on empiricism. A flaw in the evidencebased approach is absence of evidence does not provide evidence of absence5. Unprecedented
events happen all the time. Morgan Housel writes, “The irony of history is that it’s mostly the
study of things changing, often used as a guide for what to do next”7. Or perhaps Daniel
Kahneman put it bests, “that’s the correct lesson to learn from surprises: that the world is
surprising.”8
It is essential to recognize the limits of your knowledge – what can versus what can’t be known
or measured. Here’s what not to do: pretend unknown unknowns don’t exist or use sophisticated
math to try to compute something that’s incomputable.
Machines and You
There is a well-known trade-off in modeling between bias and variance. Bias represents model
error from being too simplistic; variance is error from over-fitting5. Today we capture and
process more data than ever before. These advances in computing combined with math and
ingenuity has produced novel ways to reduce bias. We are motivated to be precise because we
want our models to capture reality, but at some point, removing bias creates unwanted variance.
Machines reduce bias and can do things we can’t. For example, computer judgement is more
consistent (less noisy) than human judgement. Yet, machines don’t know everything humans
know. As the end-users, we define knowledge – it comes from our perspective. Correlations are
abundant but machines don’t have the semantic understanding to determine which associations
are meaningful9. A model is limited to the data it’s built on. This is particularly problematic in
domains that change over time.
Machine learning methods analyze vast data sets and identify patterns humans miss or take much
longer to spot9. The challenge is, they’re tough for us to audit. For example, it’s difficult to
understand how a neural network, with multiple layers and hundreds of nodes, transforms inputs
to outputs. If the decision rules were knowable, we wouldn’t need the complex model9. We
developed techniques to gain understanding in ways we can’t understand, so our fidelity to these
creations should be fragile. This line of reasoning is from Benedict Evans, who summarizes the
point well: “Machine learning finds patterns in data – what patterns depend on the data, and the
data is up to us, and what we do with it is up to us”9.
What is the proper trade-off between using relevant data and a sufficient sample size? Does this
model pass the laugh test? How confident am I that this model, built on past data, will be useful
now? Whether it’s in model building and evaluation or making decisions based on outputs, the
need for human judgement is unavoidable. We are more equipped than ever to answer questions;
we’re good at making machines do things. Now it’s on us to ask better questions and carefully

7

decide what to make them do. This is where intuition and emotions creep in, for better or for
worse.
Michael Polanyi recently introduced the notion of tacit knowledge writing, “we can know more
than we can tell”, perhaps inspired by the following excerpt from Osho’s Intuition – Knowing
Beyond Logic11, 12
In language it looks okay to ask, “Can intuition be explained?” But
it means, “Can intuition be reduced to intellect?” And intuition is
something beyond the intellect … The leap of intuition can be felt
because there is a gap. Intuition can be felt by the intellect – it can
be noted that something has happened – but it cannot be explained,
because explanation needs causality.
Not all truths are legible. Words, definitions, equations, numbers are just proxies of reality. Enter
intuition*.
My intuitions and emotions may not always be reliable, but I use them constantly to make
decisions. Emotion is a tool for learning. Feelings such as fear, joy or embarrassment provide
helpful cues about our environment and feedback on our choices13. Research from Antonio
Damasio found that patients are incapable of making decisions after having a type of brain
surgery that prevents them from experiencing emotions5. So while emotions and intuitions may
lead to bad choices, without them, we wouldn’t be able to make decisions at all. Emotions have
been described as “lubricants of reason”5.
When making uncertain decisions, I don’t know the right weights to give human judgement and
objective, mathematic methods. The answer, if it exists, is domain specific so speaking in
generalities doesn’t offer solutions. One approach is to develop algorithms that use data to
produce base rate outputs. From there, you can tweak the output based on our judgements,
intuitions, and emotions. A reverse approach has judgement as its anchor, tweaked by machines.
Again, I don’t know the right balance but I’m convinced both tools are necessary.
Don’t Die (and other useful heuristics)
This essay builds on two principle beliefs: (1) we must make decisions in an uncertain world
with incomplete information (2) time is our most precious resource. With time as a fundamental
constraint, the ideal is to do what we want, when we want, with whom we want. To that end, I
believe decision-making under uncertainty should prioritize the consequences of our actions with
the paramount goal of avoiding ruin. Consequences can be mapped to future you (or your family,
tribe, species, environment), which is more knowable than whatever future event you wish to
predict.
*According to Daniel Kahneman, the reliability of intuition is function of feedback and changes to the
environment6.
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I’ve taken this line of reasoning from Nassim Taleb who formalizes it as follows: let X represent
what you care to predict and F(X) represent how that underlying variable affects you5. We have a
greater ability to understand, adjust, control, and predict F(X) than X. For example, back to
Russia roulette, whether there is a 1/6, 1/100 or 1/1000 chance the next shot will fire a bullet can
be deemed irrelevant by refusing to play the game. In terms of monetary risks, how much you
make when you’re right and lose when you’re wrong is far more important (and controllable)
than the probability of being correct. We can’t know the future but we can control our exposure
to it.
This idea of focusing on consequences can be implemented using heuristics. Prioritizing
consequences over predictions is a heuristic itself. Another heuristic is to err on the side of
caution; the more uncertain you are about X, the less exposure you should have to it. Other
simple rules involve comparing the benefits and harms associated with a decision. This requires
having a rough understanding of the distribution of possible outcomes. Precision isn’t necessary,
but awareness for the possibility of extremely positive and negative tail events is important.
Recognizing convexity and concavity – non-linear relationships between inputs and outputs –
helps you detect asymmetric outcomes5. From there, the heuristic is intuitive: embrace
opportunities where the upside is greater than the downside and avoid the opposite. By reducing
or eliminating exposure to negative tail events, you are protected against your inability to predict
them.
Both can be true: it is our default to be risk averse and we (both personally and at greater scales)
can benefit from taking calculated risks. By calculated I mean conclusions driven by deliberate,
effortful reasoning. Decision-time can be sped up by leveraging heuristics honed through trialand-error. While maintaining a margin of safety, you can tinker with decision rules to find what
suits you best.
Ultimately, it’s your choice how you spend your time. Avoiding ruin is our default state, but
from there our preferences diverge. An incredibly fulfilling experience to one person is viewed
as a crazy risk by another. We may value time differently but it is our liberty to value time that is
universally special. What we do, desire, and aspire to be gives meaning to our lives. Worry about
what you can control and be careful exposing yourself to what you can’t control. It’s up to you.
Investing and You
This final section applies the ideas presented in this essay to investing. Investors must deal with
both non-ergodicity and epistemic uncertainty. Non-ergodicity arises because price returns are
multiplicative. After 50% price decline, a 100% price increase is required to get back to even; a
20% increase followed by a 20% decrease leaves you down 4%. And unlike the simple coin flip
game, the probability distribution for future price returns is dynamic and complex. While
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historical price changes are best estimated using a power-law distribution, the future distribution
is unknowable*.
Going back to 1928, the S&P 500 has provided an average annualized return of 8% (ignoring
dividends)14. Remember that averages of non-ergodic processes are misleading because they
don’t reflect individuals’ experiences. No one realized that 8% average. An investor who bought
in 1928 and held earned the geometric return of 6% annualized.
Other examples of information that lacks relevance comes from sexy headlines like, “If you
invested $1,000 in Microsoft 25 years ago, you would have $45,000 today – a return of 16% per
year!” Hypotheticals inform theory but distort reality. That flashy anecdote ignores the stock’s
volatile path during those 25 years. Long-term returns conveniently leave out the emotional parts
of investing. For a Microsoft stock holder, a headline number doesn’t tell you what it feels like to
experience a 75% drawdown in 2009 or see the price flat-line for a decade while other stocks
soar14.
Investing will often be disappointing if you form short-term expectations based on long-term
results. Sequence risk and path dependence causes individual investors’ returns to detach from
the long-run average. The market doesn’t know or care about your personal ergodic needs. For
this reason, its critical investors are aware of how prices behave in the short-term.
Benoit Mandelbrot discovered price changes of risky assets like stocks, bonds, and commodities
are discontinuous and interdependent15,16. Unlike the temperature outside, a stock can jump from
$70 per share to $75 in an instant. Interdependence means markets have a memory: what has
happened influences what will happen15,16. Related, he also found that volatility tends to cluster;
volatility begets volatility. For example, the 10 worst daily price declines in the S&P 500 over
the past 50 years occurred within two periods: the 3 worst days happened in October 1987 and
the next 7 worst within a 63 day window in late 2008. These characteristics help explain why
markets have tail risks and roughly follow a power-law distribution†.
The historical relationship between the frequency and magnitude of price changes can be
estimated. This scaling parameter, however, is highly sensitive to the most extreme events,
which occur least often, and is subject to perpetual revision. One data point – the 20% price drop
that occurred on October 19th 1987 – has a disproportionate influence on the estimated powerlaw17. What’s more, it would be naive to conclude that October 19th, 1987 represents the most
stocks can lose in a single day. If you don’t believe me, consider this (another insight from
Taleb): the worst event ever, when it happened, exceeded the worst event at the time. In the
*

To be exact, the distribution of stock returns is fat tailed and the tails follow a power-law.
A power-law distribution is characterized by a non-linear, proportional relationship between the frequency and
magnitude of a random variable. In simpler terms, this means most price changes are small and a small number of
price changes are very large. As a result, deviations from the center of the distribution are far from “standard”.
†
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context of investing, the key implication is massive price swings are rare and fundamentally alter
the statistical properties of the historical data. Exponentially more impactful price movements
are exponentially more difficult to predict. What impacts us most, we know about least. As a
result, the true mean and variance of returns can never be known17.
To recap, in the relative short-term (daily, weekly or monthly periods), price changes are
interdependent, discontinuous and follow a power-law. A non-ergodic process with these
attributes means investors’ unique paths have significant downside risk, at least in the short-run.
Counteracting this risk requires choosing a proper time horizon and exposure: deliberately
investing an appropriate amount of money for a predetermined amount of time.
Start by answering: why am I investing? Mapping the motives for investing to future needs and
desires gives your decisions purpose. Amidst short-term volatility, your purpose should drive
your decisions opposed to fleeting emotions that may not align with your goals. If you are
investing in stocks to help pay for your kid’s college tuition in 20 years, a big weekly price
decline shouldn’t compel you to sell. Investing for retirement using IRAs can be effective
beyond just enforcing a long time horizon because the tax benefits and penalties for early
withdrawals act as a behavioral commitment tool. The structure incentivizes investors to
continuously contribute and avoiding selling over multiple decades.
More generally, there may be benefits to investing with a longer time horizon. I emphasize may
because it’s important not to mistake absence of evidence for evidence of absence. The evidence
suggests for yearly (or longer) price changes, negative tail events are both less frequent and less
extreme. The stock market has gone up over time. The challenge with measuring increasingly
longer time periods, however, is data scarcity; longer periods have less non-overlapping
occurrences so the sample size is much smaller. Regardless, investing with purpose and choosing
a future date when you plan to sell is important.
Position sizing is the other critical component to successful investing. A carefully chosen time
horizon becomes meaningless if you are forced to prematurely sell your investment. For
example, money needed to pay recurring and unexpected expenses should not be invested in
stocks. Assuming you hold a sufficient amount of cash that prevents you from having to sell, the
next consideration is your risk appetite. What would you do if your investments were in a 30%
drawdown? If your answer is to sell, you are likely risking too much money. If weekly volatility
elicits visceral emotions, you are also probably over-exposed.
John Kelly created a neat formula to make our money gambles ergodic. Resting on two critical
inputs – the probability of winning and payoff of the investment – the Kelly criterion
recommends risking a percentage amount that maximizes long-run growth18. By construction,
the formula prescribes risking only a fraction of one’s wealth. Because bet sizes change in
response to wealth changes, following the formula keeps you in the game by making it
impossible to run out of money.
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Of course, in most situations the probabilities and payoffs can’t be known with certainty. It’s
difficult to follow a formula’s output that rests so heavily on inputs soaked in epistemic
uncertainty. For this reason, practitioners typically only risk a fraction of what Kelly
recommends.
Ultimately, there’s no formula to determine the right amount to risk; the answer is deeply
personal. The Kelly criterion provides a percentage and it’s up to you to determine your bankroll
size and whether you are comfortable with that percentage. The formula cannot ensure that its
user will maintain consistent behavior during a drawdown or after multiple losses in a row. Your
personal answer emerges through trial-and-error.
Investing is inextricably emotional; the role psychology plays can only be understood through
direct experience. How you think you will react to a 30% drawdown can be much different than
your actual reaction. Tinker with different amounts of exposure and over time you will develop a
sense for the amount you’re comfortable with. The key is to start with small exposures; invest an
amount you are confident you won’t be compelled to sell before your time horizon is up. From
there, you can consider slightly increasing your exposure. Risk taking is only worth it if you’re
able and willing to make the next bet.
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